How SPF works
Sender Policy Framework is a single TXT record published in your domain’s DNS. It names the mail servers and services permitted to send on your behalf, usually by referencing each provider’s own published list rather than by writing out addresses. When a message arrives, the receiving server looks up that record and asks a simple question: did this connection come from somewhere the domain owner allowed?
The record ends with an instruction covering everything not listed. A soft fail asks receivers to accept the message but mark it as suspect; a hard fail asks them to treat it as unauthorised. Receivers are free to interpret both, which is one reason SPF alone is not enough.
Two details catch people out. SPF checks the hidden return-path domain, not the from address your recipient reads, so a forger can pass SPF while still displaying your name — closing that gap is what DMARC exists for. And the specification caps the record at ten DNS lookups; exceed it and the check fails outright, which happens easily once several tools are added over the years.
Why SPF matters
It is the oldest and simplest of the three authentication checks, and the one most receivers look at first. Bulk mail from a domain with no SPF record has an obvious mark against it before anything else is considered, and major providers now expect bulk senders to publish one.
It is also the record most likely to be quietly broken. Because it is a single line that everything shares, adding a new invoicing tool or moving to a new email host can push it past the lookup limit and break authentication for every system at once, including mail that had worked for years.
Common mistakes with SPF
Publishing more than one SPF record for the same domain is the classic error. The specification allows only one, and a second causes a permanent error, so the correct approach when adding a sender is to extend the existing record rather than add another.
Listing everything you can think of is the next. Broad inclusions and old vendors pile up lookups and authorise services you no longer use. Prune the record when you drop a tool, not just when something breaks.
Finally, SPF does not survive most forwarding. When a recipient auto-forwards your message, the forwarding server becomes the sender and the check fails, through no fault of yours. That is expected behaviour and the reason DKIM is needed alongside it, since a DKIM signature travels with the message.
How to act on it
Write down every service that sends mail using your domain — marketing platform, website contact forms, invoicing, helpdesk, booking system, your own mail host — then build one record that covers all of them and nothing else. Publish it, then verify with a public SPF checker that it resolves cleanly and stays within the lookup limit.
Treat it as a living record. Re-check after any migration, and whenever a colleague signs up for a new tool that sends on your behalf. Pair it with DKIM and a DMARC policy, because SPF on its own protects the envelope rather than the name your customer actually sees, and a domain with only SPF still lets a convincing forgery through.
